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MENTAL HEALTH-CRIMES: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT SETS GUIDELINES FOR FORCIBLY
MEDICATING INCOMPETENT PRE-TRIAL DETAINEES
SOLELY FOR PROSECUTORIAL PURPOSES
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)
I. FACTS
In the spring of 1997, Dr. Charles Sell, D.D.S. was charged with fifty-
six counts of mail fraud, six counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count of
money laundering.' While released on bond, he attempted to hire an indi-
vidual to murder the key witnesses against him, which prompted the
government to request that his bond be revoked.2 The charges of con-
spiracy and attempted murder were added to the original indictment. 3
Due to a history of mental illness, Dr. Sell's competency to stand trial
was under suspicion from the beginning of prosecution.4 Prior to the
indictment, Dr. Sell's competency was evaluated. 5 It was determined that
he was competent to stand trial.6 However, his outrageous behavior at the
bond revocation hearing indicated that his mental condition was deteri-
orating.7 After his bond was revoked, Dr. Sell's counsel requested a
reevaluation of his competency to stand trial. 8 The court granted the
request. 9 Upon reevaluation, the court determined that Dr. Sell suffered
from a mental defect, thereby making him incompetent to stand trial. '0
1. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 170 (2003).
2. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 2002).
3. Id.
4. Sell, 539 U.S. at 169-70.
5. Id. at 170.
6. Id.
7. Id. Dr. Sell screamed, shouted, used racial epithets, and spat on the magistrate's face. Id.
8. Id.
9. Brief for the Respondent at 3, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664).
Dr. Sell suffers from delusional disorder persecutory type, a relatively uncommon disorder that is
difficult to diagnose due to an absence of observable manifestations. Brief of the American Psy-
chiatric Association and American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law as Amici Curiae at 13,
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664). Delusional disorder is similar to schiz-
ophrenia in that the individual suffering from the disorder has one or more delusions. Id. at 16.
However, unlike an individual with schizophrenia, an individual with delusional disorder does not
have visual or auditory hallucinations nor does the disorder impair their general ability to function
in society. Id. Dr. Sell's disorder was revealed through several false beliefs he held regarding the
United States Government. Brief for the Petitioner at 13, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166
(2003) (No. 02-5664). For instance, Dr. Sell believes that the charges pending against him are an
attempt by the FBI to discredit statements that he has made implicating the United States
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Once it was determined that Dr. Sell was incompetent, the court or-
dered him to receive treatment at the United States Medical Center for
Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri." While at Springfield, three
psychiatrists treated him.12 Dr. Demier and Dr. Wolfson, the two state
psychiatrists, determined that there was a high probability that Dr. Sell
would regain competency if he were administered antipsychotic medi-
cation.' 3 However, Dr. Cloninger, Sell's personal psychiatrist, did not
believe that Dr. Sell would respond well to the medications and recom-
mended that other treatments be attempted before resorting to medication.14
Dr. Sell followed the advice of Dr. Cloninger and refused to take the
antipsychotic medication. '5
The administration at the Springfield facility conducted a hearing, held
by a psychiatrist not involved in the treatment of Dr. Sell, to determine
whether or not to forcibly medicate Dr. Sell with antipsychotic medi-
cation.' 6 After considering testimony from the treating psychiatrists, the
Government in the fire at the Branch Davidian Compound at Waco, Texas. Id. He also believes
that if the FBI does not secure a conviction on the pending charges the Government might seek to
kill him. Id.; see also American Psychiatric Ass'n, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, TEXT REVISION § 297.1 (4th ed. 2000) (defining delusional disorder
persecutory type).
10. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 171 (2003).
11. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2000) (allowing the court to commit an incompetent
defendant for treatment in a suitable facility for a reasonable amount of time to determine if com-
petency can be restored). The statute allows incompetent individuals to be detained in the facility
until they regain the competency to stand trial, as long as there is a substantial probability that
competency will be regained while the individual is committed to the facility. Id. If it is deter-
mined that the individual will not regain competency to stand trial, the Government can petition
the court to commit the individual indefinitely as long as the government can prove that the
individual would be a danger to himself or others if released. Id. §§ 4241, 4246.
12. Respondent's Brief at 4, Sell (No. 02-5664).
13. Id. The use of antipsychotic medications has been the most successful method of treat-
ment for schizophrenic-like delusions. Dora W. Klein, Note, Trial Rights and Psychotropic
Drugs: The Case Against Administering Involuntary Medications to a Defendant During Trial, 55
VAND. L. REV. 165, 186 (2002). Delusions are caused by abnormal neural cell activity that is a
result of increased levels of dopamine in the brain. Id. Antipsychotic medications reduce dopa-
mine activity within the brain, thereby reducing neural cell activity. Id. Treatment with medi-
cations does not completely eliminate delusions but does reduce the impact that delusions have on
normal functioning. Id. The drugs used to treat delusions in the past had severe side effects. Id.
at 186-87. However, with advances in technology, new types of antipsychotic medications have
been developed that reduce the severity of the side effects. Id. at 188-89.
14. Respondent's Brief at 4, Sell (No. 02-5664). Alternative non-drug therapies have been
studied little. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 14 n. 11, Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664). Furthermore, it has been reasoned that an indi-
vidual suffering from delusional disorder persecutory type may not respond well to psychotherapy
because they may "be inclined to conclude that [the] therapist is part of a conspiracy against him."
Id. at 13.
15. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 563-64 (8th Cir. 2002).
16. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 171-72 (2003); see generally 28 C.F.R. § 549.43
(2003) (providing the procedure for an institution to follow when seeking to involuntarily medi-
cate an individual). The regulation provides, in relevant part:
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reviewing psychiatrist concluded that antipsychotic medications were the
most appropriate form of treatment.17 Involuntary medication was ordered
to decrease the level of danger that Dr. Sell posed to the community as well
as to make him competent to stand trial. 18
Dr. Sell exercised his right to an administrative appeal of the reviewing
psychiatrist's decision.19 The administrative official that reviewed the case
also concluded, from the testimony of the treating psychiatrists, that Dr.
Sell posed a danger to himself and others.20 Due to this finding, the admini-
strative official denied the appeal and ordered Dr. Sell to be medicated
against his will. 21 However, antipsychotic medications were not admini-
stered so that Dr. Sell could seek judicial review. 22
During the first level of judicial review, a United States magistrate
judge considered whether Dr. Sell was dangerous in light of the delusions
he suffered and his behavior while released on bond.23 The magistrate also
considered new evidence presented regarding an incident when Dr. Sell
exhibited inappropriate behavior towards a nurse within the institution. 24
Due to this information, the magistrate determined that Dr. Sell posed a
danger to himself and others within the institution. 25 He authorized forcible
(a) Procedures: When an inmate will not or cannot provide voluntary written in-
formed consent for psychotropic medication, the inmate will be scheduled for an
administrative hearing. Absent an emergency situation, the inmate will not be
medicated prior to the hearing ....
... (5) The psychiatrist conducting the hearing shall determine whether treatment or
psychotropic medication is necessary in order to attempt to make the inmate com-
petent for trial or is necessary because the inmate is dangerous to self or others, is
gravely disabled, or is unable to function in the open population of a mental health
referral center or a regular prison. The psychiatrist shall prepare a written report
regarding the decision ....
... (7) If the inmate appeals, absent a psychiatric emergency, medication will not be
administered before the administrator's decision. The inmate's appeal, which may be
handwritten, must be filed within 24 hours of the inmate's receipt of the decision.
Id.






23. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 170 (2003).
24. Id. After the administrative hearing, Dr. Sell developed an infatuation with one of the
nurses and had approached her with admonitions of love. Id. He also criticized the nurse for not
returning these feelings. Id. Dr. Sell was aware that this behavior was inappropriate, but stated "I
can't help it." Id.
25. Id. at 171.
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medication to alleviate this risk.26 The order was stayed pending Dr. Sell's
appeal. 27
The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri reversed the
magistrate's determination that Dr. Sell was dangerous. 28 In its decision,
the court considered Dr. Sell's behavior while in the facility but did not
consider his behavior while released on bond.29 It found that involuntary
medication was warranted on competency grounds alone. 30 The court rea-
soned that the government's interest in prosecuting defendants was superior
to Dr. Sell's interest in avoiding unwanted medical treatment. 31
Antipsychotic medications provided the best possible means of achieving
the government's interest.32
Both the government and Dr. Sell appealed the district court's
decision. 33 The government appealed the determination that Dr. Sell was
not dangerous. 34 Dr. Sell appealed the order to forcibly medicate him
solely to render him competent to stand trial.35
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
determination regarding dangerousness and the determination authorizing
involuntary medication on competency grounds alone. 36 In making its
determination, the two-judge majority considered whether the government
had an essential governmental interest in medicating Dr. Sell, whether there
were less intrusive methods of treatment that could be used to satisfy the
government's interest, and whether the forced medication was medically
appropriate. 37
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the government had an essential
interest in prosecuting serious crimes, but recognized that not all crimes
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 173-74. The district court stated that danger was relative to the particular time in
the particular situation. Id. They refused to postulate on Sell's dangerousness if released. Id.
Because Sell was being housed in an open ward and not in a locked cell, the court reasoned that
Dr. Sell could not be dangerous enough to warrant involuntarily medication. Id.





34. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 565 (8th Cir. 2002).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 565-66. The court agreed with the district court that Sell's behavior regarding the
nurse amounted to "at most... an inappropriate familiarity and even infatuation with a nurse."
Id. at 565.
37. Id. at 567. The court stated that "[miedication is medically appropriate if: (1) it is likely
to render the patient competent, (2) the likelihood and gravity of side effects do not overwhelm its
benefits and, (3) it is in the best medical interests of the patient." Id.
[VOL. 80:355
CASE COMMENT
were serious enough to warrant involuntary medication.3 8 The majority
considered the charges on the original indictment of mail fraud, Medicaid
fraud, and money laundering, and concluded that they we're serious enough
to warrant forcible medication.3 9 After finding that the government had an
essential interest, the court considered the available treatments.a0 The only
treatment proposed by either party was medication, so the court determined
that there were no less intrusive means to satisfy the governmental
interest.41 The court concluded that antipsychotic medications were medi-
cally appropriate because they would have a positive impact on Dr. Sell's
life.4 2
Dr. Sell appealed the Eighth Circuit's ruling, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 43 The United States Supreme Court held
that before antipsychotic medications were given involuntarily to a pre-trial
detainee, the court must find (1) an important governmental interest, (2) that
will be significantly furthered by medication, that is (3) necessary, and (4)
medically appropriate. 44
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A noticeable proportion of individuals awaiting trial suffer from mental
illness.45 If the mental illness makes the individual legally incompetent, the
government must delay prosecution and wait until the individual regains
competency before proceeding with the trial. 46 One method used to restore
competency requires the use of antipsychotic medications.47 Historically,
when the detainee refuses to take antipsychotic medications, the govern-
ment has justified forcible medication by finding that the detainee poses a
danger to others, or by finding that the detainee is medically incompetent.
48




42. Id. at 571.
43. Sell v. United States, 537 U.S. 999, 999 (2003).
44. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
45. David M. Siegel, Albert J. Grudzinskas, Jr. & Debra A. Pinals, M.D., Old Law Meets
New Medicine: Revisiting Involuntary Psychotropic Medication of the Criminal Defendant, 2001
WIS. L. REV. 307, 355-56 (2001); Marcia Coyle, A Cloudy Future for Forced Medication: After
the Ruling, More Litigation?, NAT'L L.J., JUNE 23, 2003, at 1, available at Westlaw, Legal News-
papers Database. Roughly sixteen percent of inmates are candidates for forcible medication. Id.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2000).
47. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992) (describing the purpose of anti-
psychotic drugs).
48. Siegel, supra note 45, at 357; see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 226-27
(1990) (finding that a convicted prisoner could be medicated against his will when the prisoner
was a danger to himself and others); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 495 (4th Cir. 1987)
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If the government fails to show that the detainee is dangerous or medically
incompetent, it has sought to forcibly medicate the detainee solely for
prosecutorial purposes.49 This solution implicates both the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. 50 The impact that Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
has had on the government's ability to forcibly medicate pretrial defendants
should be examined in order to gain a full understanding of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Sell v. United States.S'
A. LEGAL INCOMPETENCE
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires that "[n]o
person.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." 52  The Sixth Amendment ensures a fair trial by requiring that an
accused individual have the opportunity to participate in his or her own
defense. 53 In Pate v. Robinson,5 4 the Court held that adjudication of an
incompetent defendant violated the individual's due process rights under
the Fifth Amendment and the individual's fair trial rights under the Sixth
Amendment. 55 To protect these rights, the Court requires that the defen-
dant's competency be assessed prior to trial. 56
Courts use a two-prong test, developed in Dusky v. United States,57 to
assess a defendant's competency.8 The Dusky test requires that a
defendant have a "rational as well as factual understanding of the
rev'd on other grounds, 863 F.2d 302, 304 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that an individual could be
forcibly medicated if found medically incompetent). In order to be medically competent an indi
vidual must follow "a rational process" when refusing medical treatment. Charters, 829 F.2d at
496-97. To demonstrate that a rational process has been followed the individual must be able to
articulate reasons for refusing treatment. Id.
49. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133.
50. Id. at 133, 145.
51. 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Id.; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975) (stating that the right to a fair trial
includes the right to effective counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the
right to testify on one's own behalf).
54. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
55. Pate, 383 U.S. at 378.
56. Id.
57. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
58. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
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proceedings against him" and a "sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer" in order to be found competent by a court.59 If a court deter-
mines that the defendant is incompetent, the prosecution must halt until the
defendant's competency is restored.60 While awaiting restoration of com-
petence, the government may request that the individual be admitted into a
mental health facility until the trial can begin.
61
B. MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES' ABILITY TO REGULATE INMATES
BEHAVIOR
In Bell v. Wolfish,62 the Court considered whether a correctional facility
temporarily housing pre-trial detainees could impose restrictions on the
detainees without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.63 The Court held that while pre-trial detainees should not be granted
the same degree of freedoms that individuals not charged with crimes, they
should be granted at least the freedoms granted to prisoners.64 Prisoners
had previously been granted protection under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 65 Thus, the Court held that pre-trial detainees also re-
tained Due Process protection guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
66
However, the Court approved restrictions on the scope of a detainee's Fifth
59. Id. The Dusky standard was codified in 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), which states that an
individual is incompetent if "the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him ... unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense." 18
U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2000).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
63. Bell, 441 U.S. at 523. The Court was concerned with the institution's policies regarding
the overcrowded conditions of the facility, the method in which searches were conducted, and the
insufficient educational and recreational opportunities. Id. at 527. The Court also considered
whether prohibiting the detainees from receiving hardcover books not mailed directly from the
publisher violated the detainee's First Amendment rights. Id. at 549-50; U.S. CONST. amend I.
The First Amendment states that "[c]ongress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech." U.S. CONST. amend I. The Amendment has generally been interpreted broadly. Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982). Courts have found that it explicitly
protects the communication of ideas and it implicitly protects production of ideas. Bee v.
Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393-94 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404
(1989) (stating that the Court has "long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or
written word"). The Court has shunned government interference that attempts to control an
individual's beliefs. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (stating that "[olur whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's
minds"); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1976); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (stating that the purpose of the First Amendment was
to prevent the intellect from being officially controlled).
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Amendment rights.67 For instance, the Court held that the Fifth Amend-
ment only required the restrictions placed on detainees not amount to
punishment.68 If the government could show that the restriction was
reasonably related to a legitimate government interest it would not be
considered punishment. 69 The Court found that the government had a
legitimate interest in maintaining security within the facility and in securing
detainees' presence at trial. 70 The restrictions placed on the detainees
furthered the government's interests; thus, the restrictions were
constitutional. 71
Similarly in Youngberg v. Romeo,72 the Court addressed the treatment
of individuals committed to mental health facilities. 73 The Court found that
an individual suffering from a mental illness had a due process liberty
interest in avoiding unnecessary medical treatment.74 Romeo had a history
of harming himself and others. 75 To prevent him from harming other pa-
tients within the facility, his physician ordered that he be physically
restrained when it appeared he was dangerous. 76 The Court balanced the
individual's liberty interest against the government's interest in safety and
determined that as long as certain procedural safeguards were implemented,
restrictions on the individual's liberty could be imposed. 77 The procedural
safeguards implemented by the Court allowed restrictions to be imposed if a
qualified health professional determined that the treatment was medically
appropriate. 78
67. Id. at 545-46.
68. Id. at 536-37.
69. Id. at 539.
70. Id. at 539-40.
71. Id. at 561-62.
72. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
73. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309.
74. Id. at 315-16; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (finding that an
individual suffering from a mental disorder had a due process liberty in avoiding treatment).
75. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 310.
76. Id. at 310-11.
77. Id. at 321.
78. Id. at 322-23. The Court noted that as long as the decision to restrain the individual was
made by a mental health professional it would be presumed to be correct unless it was a
"substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards . I..." Id.; see
also Parham, 442 U.S. at 607-09 (recognizing that mental health professionals are more qualified




C. INVOLUNTARY ADMINISTRATION OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC
MEDICATION
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
protects an individual's rights in life, liberty, or property from being un-
necessarily infringed upon.79 When the Fifth Amendment is implicated, a
two-step analysis is required. 80 The first step requires the court to deter-
mine if the interest asserted by the individual is covered by the
Amendment's protection of "life, liberty, or property."81 The Court has
generally recognized that the liberty provision of the Fifth Amendment
encompasses the right to be free from bodily restraint and punishment.
82
The Court has also recognized that the liberty provision protects an
individual's fundamental rights.83 If the interest is protected, the court must
then determine the best procedure to protect those rights.84
Several courts have struggled when determining whether the Due
Process analysis required by the Fifth Amendment remains the same when
the individual alleging a Due Process violation is a pre-trial defendant who
was incompetent due to a mental illness.85 Specifically, courts have strug-
gled to determine when a mentally ill prisoner or pre-trial detainee can be
forced to undergo unwanted treatment so the government can prosecute.
86
1. Initial Rulings Regarding Involuntary Medication
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first appellate court to
consider whether the government could forcibly medicate a pre-trial
detainee. 87 The court held that if a liberty interest was found, Bell and
Youngberg required it to determine whether the detainee's liberty interest
79. U.S. CONST. amend V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment states that "no person shall he... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend V.
80. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 673-74.
83. Id. at 674; see generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
927 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that liberty
includes the fundamental right to bodily integrity); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 262 (1990) (holding that the liberty provision includes the right to make medical decisions);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (finding the liberty provision to include the
fundamental right to privacy when making familial decisions).
84. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672.
85. Angelina N. McDonald, In Search of a Standard of Review: Decisions to Forcibly
Medicate Pre-trial Detainees in Light of Riggins v. Nevada, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 286 (2003).
86. See id.
87. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1389 (10th Cir. 1984).
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was outweighed by the government's interest.88 The court recognized that a
pre-trial detainee had a liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication.8 9
The court went on to acknowledge that the government had an interest in
maintaining the detainee's competence to stand trial and an interest in
maintaining security within the facility. 90 However, the court found that
neither interest outweighed the individual's interest.91 The court stated that
the government's interest in maintaining competency was not compelling
enough because it ignored the needs of the individual.92 The court held the
second interest, maintaining institutional safety, could only be compelling if
the government could show an emergency existed that made medication
necessary.93 Because the government had not shown that the medication
was necessary, the court denied the order.94
Four years later, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also considered
whether the Government could forcibly medicate a mentally ill pre-trial
detainee.95 The court recognized that a pre-trial detainee had a liberty
interest in being free from medication, but because the individual was a pre-
trial detainee, his liberty interest "must yield to the legitimate government
interests ... incidental [to his] institutionalization."96 The court held that an
order to medicate would be upheld if a qualified mental health professional
determined that medication was necessary. 97 The court further held that a
decision to forcibly medicate made by a qualified mental health profess-
sional should not be overturned by the judiciary unless the decision was
made arbitrarily. 98
2. Forcibly Medicating Convicted Prisoners
In Washington v. Harper,99 the Court attempted to clear up the
confusion of whether the Government could administer antipsychotic drugs
involuntarily to a convicted prisoner.100 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
88. Id. at 1394.
89. Id. at 1392-93.
90. Id. at 1394. The court also recognized a third governmental interest, the state's duty to
provide inmates with medical treatment. Id. The court found that the interest was not legitimate.
Id. at 1395.
91. Id. at 1395-96.
92. Id. at 1395.
93. Id. at 1395-96.
94. Id. at 1396-97.
95. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 1988).
96. Id. at 305.
97. Id. at 312.
98. Id. at 313.
99. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
100. Harper, 494 U.S. at 222, 224.
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majority, recognized that a convicted prisoner had a liberty interest in
avoiding unwanted medication.' 0' However, the scope of the prisoner's
rights was limited by the conditions of his confinement.102 The Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was satisfied if the
prison regulations were reasonably related to a legitimate government
interest, even when the right infringed upon was fundamental. 
103
The Court found that the Government had an important interest in
protecting prisoners from danger.104 It reasoned that if an inmate was dan-
gerous due to mental illness, antipsychotic medications that would control
the danger were warranted because medication was the best way to treat a
mental illness that caused violent behavior. 105
However, the Court held that before medication could be administered,
a mental health professional must find that the medication is medically
appropriate.106 Mental health professionals are more qualified than judges
to determine whether a certain treatment is medically appropriate. 07 Thus,
the Court concluded that a decision made by a mental health professional
authorizing medication would not be overruled, unless the order granting
involuntary medication was made arbitrarily. 1
08
3. Forcibly Medicating Incompetent Pre-Trial Detainees
The Harper decision provided lower courts with some guidance but
failed to provide guidance in cases where the government was seeking to
medicate a pre-trial detainee-not a convicted prisoner.109 The Court took
up this issue in Riggins v. Nevada110 by deciding whether an incompetent
pre-trial detainee could be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs. " '
The petitioner in Riggins was given antipsychotic medications to make
him competent to stand trial on murder charges." 2 He was subsequently
found guilty. 113 He appealed the conviction, claiming the medication given
101. Id. at 221-22.
102. Id. at 222.
103. Id. at 223 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
104. Id. at 225.
105. Id. at 226-27.
106. Id. at 231.
107. Id. at 232.
108. See id. at 231-33.
109. McDonald, supra note 85, at 286.
110. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
111. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 132-33.
112. Id. at 130-31.
113. Id. at 131.
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to him against his will impeded his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial
and violated his Due Process rights.'" 4
The Court spent the majority of its opinion discussing the effects that
antipsychotic medications had on Riggin's ability to receive a fair trial."15
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, took judicial notice of the side
effects of antipsychotic medications. 1' 6 The Court found that the side ef-
fects Riggins suffered might have created unconstitutional trial prejudice by
impacting his appearance and the content of his testimony during trial.lI 7
The Court found, however, that forcible administration of antipsychotic
medications would not per se violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a fair trial.18 The Court approved the use of antipsychotic medications
having a detrimental effect on a defendant's right to a fair trial, as long as
the government could present an overriding justification for medicating the
defendant. 119
Riggins also recognized that a pre-trial detainee had a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medical treatment. 120 The
Court found that the individual's Due Process rights would be satisfactorily
protected if the state could show three things. 121 First, the state must show
that the medication was medically appropriate.122 Second, the state must
show that it had an "essential state interest" justifying forcible medi-
cation. 123 Last, the state must show that their "essential state interest" could
not have been satisfied through "less intrusive alternatives." 24
Neither the state nor the lower courts found any justification for
forcibly medicating Riggins. 125 The Court reversed the conviction and
remanded the case for further consideration consistent with the opinion. 126
The Court speculated, in dicta, two governmental interests that could
have been presented that may have justified forcible medication.127 The
first interest identified was the government's interest in protecting the
safety of inmates in the facility where the pre-trial defendant was being
114. Id. at 131-32.
115. Id. at 136-38.
116. Id. at 136-37.
117. Id. at 137-38.
118. Id. at 138.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 133-34.




125. Id. at 138.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 135.
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detained. 28 The second interest identified was the government's interest in
prosecuting defendants.129 The Court concluded that the government could
justify involuntarily medicating a pre-trial defendant if it would make the
defendant less dangerous.130 However, the Court avoided deciding whether
involuntary medication could be justified solely for prosecutorial
purposes.' 3'
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, expanded on the Court's opinion
by differentiating the Riggins decision from the decision in Harper.1
32
Harper merely stood for the principle that an individual's right to avoid
medication could be overridden by legitimate penological interests.
133
However, he argued that Riggins expanded Harper by finding that pre-trial
detainees enjoyed special rights that separated them from convicted
prisoners. 34 In particular, pre-trial detainees enjoyed fair trial guarantees
that convicted prisoners did not have because they had already gone
through the trial process.135 He argued the government could not forcibly
medicate a pre-trial defendant, when medication served the purpose of
restoring the defendant's competence, if the drug's side effects would
interfere with the defendant's ability to receive a fair trial. 136 He concluded
that the government would rarely be able to show that the medications
would not prejudice the defendant and courts would rarely be able to order
forcible medication. 137
4. Circuit Split Following Riggins
Following Riggins, lower courts considering whether to allow forcible
administration of antipsychotic medications were divided as to whether to
follow Justice Kennedy's concurrence by requiring the government to show
that forcible medication would not negatively impact the defendant's Sixth
128. Id.
129. Id.; see Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that
the ability to prosecute individuals for crimes "is fundamental to a scheme of 'ordered liberty' and
a prerequisite to social justice and peace").
130. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 139-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 140.
134. Id. at 140-41.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 141. Justice Kennedy expressed reservations that the government would ever be
able to show that treatment with antipsychotic medication would not prejudice the defendant. Id.
137. Id. at 140-43. Justice Kennedy compared involuntarily medicating a pre-trial defendant
with evidence tampering. Id. at 142. Among the side effects discussed by Justice Kennedy were
restlessness, drowsiness, constipation, changes in blood pressure, and parkinsonism, a disorder
"characterized by tremor of the limbs, diminished range of facial expression, or slowed functions,
such as speech." Id. at 143.
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Amendment rights. 38 Lower courts were also split on whether the
restoration of competence for prosecutorial purposes was a significant
enough governmental interest to override a pre-trial detainee's consti-
tutionally protected rights in avoiding antipsychotic medications.139
Ultimately, lower courts used two different approaches when deciding
whether to approve an order to involuntarily medicate an incompetent
defendant. 40 In the first approach, courts applied a form of heightened
scrutiny.141 These courts found that the Riggins decision placed a burden
on the government to prove that involuntary medication was necessary to
achieve an important governmental interest.14 2 Factors used in this ap-
proach included (1) whether the medication was likely to render the
defendant competent to stand trial, (2) whether adjudication of the
defendant's guilt or innocence could be accomplished through less intrusive
means, (3) whether the treatment would unduly intrude on the defendant's
liberty and privacy interests, (4) whether the medication would harm the
defendant's health, and (5) whether the seriousness of the crime warranted
involuntary medication.143 If the government failed to show by clear and
138. Compare United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998) (requiring the
government show that the medication will not negatively impact the defendant's right to a fair trial
before allowing the defendant to be forcibly medicated), with United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d
873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that the risk discussed by Justice Kennedy is so small that it
does not need to be considered by the court when determining whether or not to grant an order to
involuntarily medicate a pre-trial defendant").
139. See Brandon, 158 F.3d at 957 (stating that Riggins did not determinatively set forth an
applicable standard for courts to follow when deciding if medication could be ordered solely for
prosecutorial purposes); see also State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 962 (Conn. 1995) (stating that it
was "unclear [from the Riggins opinion] whether the Supreme Court, in using the word 'might,'
intended to reserve the issue of whether the state can justify involuntary treatment to restore a
defendant to competency for the sole purpose of bringing him to trial"); Harrison v. State, 635 So.
2d 894, 905 (Miss. 1994) (noting that "although [Riggins] absolutely mandates that certain
findings be made, it does not enlighten as to exactly what those findings must be"); see generally
Klein, supra note 13, at 173-76 (discussing the inconsistent application of the Riggins decision);
Aimee Feinberg, Forcible Medication of Mentally Ill Criminal Defendants: The Case of Russell
Eugene Weston, Jr., 54 STAN. L. REV. 769, 773-75 (2002) (discussing the confusion that arose
from the use of the word "might" in relation to the government's prosecutorial interest in the
Riggins decision).
140. United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1067 (2001).
141. Id.; see generally Brandon, 158 F.3d at 957 (adopting strict scrutiny); Kulas v. Valdez,
159 F.3d 453, 455 (9th Cir. 1998) (adopting heightened scrutiny); United States v. Sanchez-
Hurtado, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (adopting heightened scrutiny); Garcia, 658
A.2d at 966 (adopting strict scrutiny); State v. Odiaga, 871 P.2d 801, 804 (Idaho 1994) (adopting
heightened scrutiny); Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 165-66 (D.C. 1992) (adopting a form
of heightened scrutiny).
142. Odiaga, 871 P.2d at 804.
143. Garcia, 658 A.2d at 966-67.
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convincing evidence that forcible medication was necessary, the order to
medicate would not be granted.144
The lower courts, using the second approach, have not held the
government to such a high standard.145 These courts held that an order to
involuntarily medicate a pre-trial detainee could be granted as long as the
medication was medically appropriate.146 In order to be medically appro-
priate, the order must have been based on the judgment of mental health
professionals. 147 An order to medicate would be denied only if the mental
health professional's recommendation was made arbitrarily.148
D. APPROPRIATE TIME FOR A PRE-TRIAL DETAINEE TO CHALLENGE
AN ORDER ALLOWING INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION
Traditionally, only final decisions are appealable.149 This principle was
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which only allows appeals of final deci-
sions. 150 The statute works to keep the court system as efficient as possible
by not allowing an individual to appeal a decision that is merely a step in
the judicial process.151 This saves the court time by sparing it from hearing
every appealable issue arising during the proceeding.152 All appealable
issues are merged together after the final decision and are then heard by a
reviewing court. 153
Congress and the Supreme Court have both recognized exceptions to
28 U.S.C. § 1291.154 Congress provided an exception to the final decision
requirement by allowing certain interlocutory orders to be appealed under
28 U.S.C. § 1292.155 The Supreme Court also provided an exception to the
144. Id.
145. Weston, 255 F.3d at 879; see United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 262 (4th Cir.
1999) (applying rational basis scrutiny); see also United States v. Keeven, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1132,
1137 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (applying rational basis scrutiny).
146. Morgan, 193 F.3d at 262.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (stating in relevant part that "the courts of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States").
151. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (1949).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 546-47; 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000).
155. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545; 28 U.S.C. § 1292. The statute states in pertinent part:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States... granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to
dissolve or modify injunctions ....
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final decision requirement of 28 U.S.C. §1291 in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp.156 The Cohen exception, also known as the collateral
order exception, allows an appeal to be brought if a non-final decision
cannot be effectively reviewed on appeal.' 57
In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,158 the Court created a two-part test
that determined whether a non-final decision fell within the collateral order
exception created in Cohen.159 The test required (1) the non-final decision
to decisively resolve an issue separate from the merits of the action, and (2)
the non-final decision could not be merged with other issues upon the final
judgment. 160
Most interlocutory appeals in criminal trials have been denied.161
However, the Supreme Court has allowed interlocutory appeals in three
situations. 162 In Stack v. Boyle, 163 the Court allowed a motion to reduce bail
to be reviewed prior to the end of the trial. 164 In Abney v. United States,165
the Court permitted an interlocutory appeal on an order denying a pretrial
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.166 Lastly, in Helstoski v.
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up
receiverships ....
(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof deter-
mining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which
appeals from final decrees are allowed.
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The
Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order... Provided,
however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the
district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall
so order.
Id.
156. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
157. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
158. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
159. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.
160. Id.
161. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (denying an appeal on an order
disqualifying counsel); see also United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 270
(1982) (denying an appeal on an order that denied a motion to dismiss); Carroll v. United States,
354 U.S. 394, 415 (1957) (denying an appeal on an order denying a request to suppress evidence).
162. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. at 265.
163. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
164. Stack, 342 U.S. at 7.
165. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
166. Abney, 431 U.S. at 659.
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Meanor,167 the Court allowed a congressman to appeal a non-final decision
in order to assert his immunity rights under the Speech and Debate
Clause.168 Additionally, lower courts have recognized that a pre-trial order
allowing an incompetent individual to be involuntarily medicated was a
non-final order that can be appealed under the collateral order exception. 169
E. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
An individual has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
avoiding unwanted medical treatment. 170 When an individual has been con-
fined for medical treatment, the liberty interest is implicated.17' However,
the individual can later be medicated involuntarily if the government
obtains a court order.172 Court orders allowing involuntary medication have
been granted if the individual is a danger to himself or others and if the
individual is medically incompetent.173 Recently, the government has
sought to involuntarily medicate individuals solely to render them
competent to stand trial. 174
Neither of the two Supreme Court cases dealing with involuntarily
medicating an individual, Riggins and Harper, directly ruled on whether a
pre-trial defendant could be medicated solely to render the defendant com-
petent to stand trial.175 Both decisions alluded that forcible medications on
those grounds may be constitutional if (1) antipsychotic medications were
medically appropriate, (2) the government had an essential interest that
would be furthered by medicating the defendant, and (3) antipsychotic
medications were the least intrusive means by which the government could
achieve its interest.176 However, because the language used by the Court in
both cases was ambiguous, lower courts determining whether to grant an
order to involuntarily medicate an incompetent individual solely for
prosecutorial purposes were uncertain on how to rule.177
167. 442 U.S. 500 (1979).
168. Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 508.
169. See United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2002), vacated by 539 U.S. 939
(2003) (stating that the order falls within the exception to the final order requirement); see also
United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (affirming an order to forcibly
medicate a pre-trial detainee); United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 950-51 (6th Cir. 1998)
(stating that the order falls within the exception to the final order requirement).
170. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
171. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-01 (1979).
172. 28 C.F.R. § 549.43 (2003).
173. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990).
174. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
175. Id.; Harper, 494 U.S. at 222.
176. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135; Harper, 494 U.S. at 225.
177. United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 957 (6th Cir. 1998).
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III. ANALYSIS
Sell was decided by a six-to-three majority.178 The majority held that
under limited circumstances the government could forcibly medicate
incompetent defendants solely for the purpose of rendering them competent
to stand trial.' 79 Justice Breyer delivered the majority opinion in which
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
joined.180 Justice Scalia dissented; Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined
him.181 Justice Scalia questioned the Court's power to review the decision
ordering forcible medication.182
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority addressed two issues: whether an order granting the
government the power to involuntarily administer medications to a pre-trial
defendant was immediately appealable, and whether forcibly medicating an
incompetent criminal defendant in order to render the defendant competent
violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial.183 The Court held that an order granting the
forcible medication of a pre-trial detainee was immediately appealable.184
The Court also held that a pre-trial defendant could be involuntarily medi-
cated with antipsychotic drugs as long as certain factors were satisfied.185 It
vacated the Eighth Circuit decision to grant an order to involuntarily medi-
cate Dr. Sell and remanded the case so that the order could be reconsidered
in light of its decision.1
86
1. Reviewability of a Pre-trial Order to Involuntarily Medicate
The Court began by recognizing that an order allowing forcible
medication falls within the category of pre-trial orders that normally are not
appealable until the end of a trial. 187 The Court then analyzed 28 U.S.C. §
1291 requiring review only after final decisions.1 88 The Court held that in a
criminal proceeding, the term "final decision" referred to a "judgment of
178. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
179. Id. at 179-85.
180. Id. at 186.
181. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 186-87.
183. Id. at 175, 177.
184. Id. at 177.
185. Id. at 179.
186. Id. at 186.
187. Id. at 176.
188. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000)).
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guilt, that terminates a criminal proceeding."l 8 9 However, the Court found
that an order to involuntarily medicate a pre-trial detainee fell within the
collateral order exception to the finality requirement. 190
First, the Court determined that the order granting involuntary medi-
cation decides the disputed question. 191 Second, the Court held that the
order resolves an important issue that is separate from the merits of the
actions. 192 The Court reasoned that the issue, whether to forcibly medicate
an individual, was important because it raised constitutional concerns. 193
The Court noted that in a criminal prosecution, the goal of the prosecution
is to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 194 It reasoned that
since the order to involuntarily medicate did not pertain to the defendant's
guilt or innocence, it is distinct from the merits of the action. 195
Lastly, the Court found that the order was "effectively unreviewable"
after a final judgment was entered.1 96 The Court reasoned that the indi-
vidual challenging an order to involuntarily medicate does so to avoid being
involuntarily medicated.197 If the order was not appealable until after trial,
the individual would have suffered "the very harm that he [sought] to
avoid."198 Furthermore, the Court concluded that once the order had been
carried out, the harm from involuntary treatment could not be undone even
if the defendant was acquitted of the charges pending against him. 199
2. Forcible Administration of Antipsychotic Medication to a
Criminal Defendant
Then the Court turned to the second issue: whether an incompetent
pre-trial defendant could be forced by the government to take antipsychotic
medications solely for prosecutorial purposes. 200 As in Harper and Riggins,
the Court found that a pre-trial detainee had a constitutionally protected









197. Id. at 176-77.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 177.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 177-79(citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134-35 (1992); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990)). The Court rejected Sell's argument that because he had an
important First Amendment interest in avoiding medication, the Court should adopt strict scrutiny.
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ruled, must be protected by sufficient procedural regulations. 202 To protect
the individual's liberty interest, the Court ruled that the government must
show the four implicit factors of Harper and Riggins before the court will
grant an order allowing the defendant to be forcibly medicated. 203
The government must first show that it has an important governmental
interest. 204 Then it must show that forcibly medicating the pre-trial detainee
would "significantly further" the government's interest. 205  Third, the
government must show that involuntary medication was "necessary to
further" the governmental interest. 206 Finally, the government must show
that the medication was medically appropriate.207
a. Important Governmental Interest
The Court held that the government had an important interest in
"bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime." 208 The Court
reasoned that this interest stemmed from society's desire to protect itself
from crime against persons or property. 209 However, the Court asserted that
society's interest in security is not the same for every crime.210 Certain
crimes intensify society's interest in protecting itself, while other crimes are
not viewed by society as threatening to its security.2 11 The Court found that
the government's interest in prosecution is dependent on the purpose from
which that interest stems.212 Thus, the Court held that each criminal charge
must be scrutinized to determine how threatening it is to society's se-
curity.213 The less threatening the crime is to society, the less important the
interest in prosecution is to the government. 214
In addition to the seriousness of the crime, the Court also instructed
courts to consider the impact that confinement to a-mental institution would
Id. at 180; see also Reply Brief of Petitioner at 4, Sell v. United States 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No.
02-5664).
202. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
203. Id. at 180-81 (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990)).
204. Id. at 180.
205. Id. at 181.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 180.
209. See id. (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)




213. Id. "Courts, however, must consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating the




have on the importance of the government's prosecutorial interest. 2 15 The
Court reasoned that confinement of a mentally ill defendant may both
weaken and strengthen the need for prosecution.2 l 6 The Court recognized
that confinement to a mental institution achieved some of the same societal
goals that would be achieved through prosecution, thereby weakening the
government's interest in prosecution. 17 For instance, the Court reasoned
that confinement to a mental institution may be enough punishment to deter
the individual from harming society's interests once released. 2 18 The Court
also recognized that the government's interest could be strengthened due to
the requirement that the government timely prosecute individuals charged
with crimes.2 19 It concluded that while the trial was postponed due to the
defendant's confinement in a mental institution, the government runs the
risk that important evidence may be lost or that witnesses may forget
essential facts.2
20
b. Medication Significantly Furthers Governmental Interest
The Court held that in order to significantly further a governmental
interest, the medication must be "substantially likely to render the defendant
competent to stand trial." 221 The Court determined that the recommended
medication cannot have side effects that will substantially impair the
defendant's right to a fair trial. 222 If the medication does have side effects
that will impair the defendant's right to a fair trial, the medication will not
be allowed. 223 In particular, the Court ordered the lower courts to deter-
mine whether the recommended drug would sedate the defendant, interfere
with the defendant's ability to communicate with his or her attorney,
prevent the defendant from reacting to trial developments, or diminish the
defendant's ability to express emotions.224
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See id. (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(explaining that prosecution of serious crimes protected the interest of an ordered society by
punishing the individual that committed the crime and deterring others from committing crime)).
The court points out that the mentally ill defendant is a lesser threat to society's interests in
security while confined to a mental institution. Id.
218. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2000) (requiring the length of confinement in the
mental institution to be credited towards the final sentence)).
219. Id. at 180.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 181
222. See id (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment) (identifying the risks that side effects of antipsychotic medications have on fair trial
rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment)).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 185.
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c. Medication Necessary to Further Governmental Interest
In order to be necessary, the Court held that medication should be the
least intrusive treatment available that would likely restore the defendant's
competency. 225 The Court determined that before forcibly medicating the
defendant, less intrusive methods of administration must be attempted.226
The Court concluded that more intrusive methods could be used only if an
attempt to use less intrusive methods failed.227
d. Medically Appropriate Treatment
To be medically appropriate, the Court concluded that the treatment
must be in the individual's best medical interest. 228 The Court held that
other courts, in determining if medication was in the individual's best medi-
cal interest, should look at many factors including the possible side effects,
the patient's medical condition, and the probability of the medication suc-
cessfully relieving the symptoms of the patient's condition.229
The Court recommended that before courts grant an order to forcibly
medicate the pre-trial detainee so that he would regain trial competency,
they should determine whether involuntary medication could be accom-
plished using an alternative ground other than trial competency. 230 The
Court identified two alternative grounds upon which an order to forcibly
medicate could be based.231 The first alternative would require lower courts
to consider whether an order to forcibly medicate a pre-trial defendant
could be granted solely on the defendant's dangerousness. 232 The second
alternative would require lower courts to order involuntary medication if the
pre-trial defendant was found to be medically incompetent. 233 The Court
asserted that if an order to involuntarily medicate could be granted on either
of these alternative grounds, courts would not have to expand their analysis
to consider the trial competency issue.234
The Court then pointed to various reasons that made a determination to
medicate solely on alternative grounds superior to a determination to
225. Id. at 181.
226. Id. The Court suggested that a possible, less intrusive method would be to back-up an
order to take the medication with the contempt power. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 179.
230. Id. at 181.
231. Id. at 182.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 183.
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medicate using the factors set out in the opinion.235 For instance, the Court
determined that it was easier for medical professionals to determine whether
medication would render the defendant less dangerous than it was for medi-
cal professionals to determine whether medication would render the de-
fendant competent.236 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that findings
made when determining whether medication could be ordered on alternative
grounds would help courts by providing the information needed to deter-
mine if forcible medication was appropriate.
237
The Court noted that the district court's and appellate court's deter-
mination that Dr. Sell was not dangerous contradicted the facts presented in
the case. 238 Neither court took seriously the magistrate judge's deter-
mination that Dr. Sell was dangerous. 239 Both courts also failed to take
seriously the psychiatrist's testimony regarding Dr. Sell's dangerousness
and the evidence of Dr. Sell's inappropriate behavior within the facility.
240
The Court theorized that had these courts considered these factors with
sufficient weight, Dr. Sell would likely have been found dangerous and
involuntarily medicated on those grounds. 241 However, since the govern-
ment did not argue that Dr. Sell was dangerous, the Court "must assume
that Sell was not dangerous." 242
Assuming that Dr. Sell was not dangerous, the Court found that the
Eighth Circuit's order to involuntarily medicate Dr. Sell solely on com-
petency grounds was erroneous. 243 The Court based its decision on the
lower court's failure to consider the impact Dr. Sell's refusal to take
antipsychotic medications had on the government's interest in prosecuting
him, and the lower court's failure to consider the impact that potential side
effects would have had on Dr. Sell's ability to receive a fair trial. 244 Thus,
235. Id. at 182.
236. Id. The Court stated that "[t]he inquiry into whether medication is permissible... to
render an individual nondangerous is ... more 'objective and manageable' than the inquiry into
whether medication is permissible to render a defendant competent." Id. (quoting Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
237. Id. at 183. The Court reasoned that the alternative grounds will "direct medical and
legal focus" on questions applicable to the determination of whether to grant an order to forcibly
medicate solely for prosecutorial purposes. Id.




242. Id. at 185.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 185-86.
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the Court vacated and remanded the Eighth Circuit's decision in order for
these determinations to be made.245
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT
Justice Scalia argued that the administrative proceedings followed by
the government, were all that was needed to require Dr. Sell to be medi-
cated against his will. 246 He argued that once the administrative decision
was made, the government "possessed the requisite authority to administer
forced medication." 247 He noted that the government failed to recognize its
power to medicate, and incorrectly allowed the court system to review the
administrative order without objection. 248
Justice Scalia analyzed the statutory requirements and the excep-
tions. 249 He argued that the order to forcibly medicate was not immediately
appealable because it was neither a final order as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1291, nor an interlocutory exception codified by Congress at 28 U.S.C. §
1292.250 He also argued that the order was not appealable as a collateral
order because the judicially created collateral order exception found in
Cohen was not satisfied. 251
Justice Scalia argued that an order to forcibly medicate was reviewable
from a final judgment. 252 He reasoned that the decision in Riggins es-
tablished that an order to medicate a pre-trial defendant was reviewable
after conviction. 253 Justice Scalia discredited the majority's contention that
the order was unreviewable because the defendant would still suffer harm
even if acquitted. 254 Justice Scalia was not willing to make the order re-
viewable merely because some day in the future it might not be review-
able.255 He reasoned that the unreviewability requirement of the collateral
order doctrine was not satisfied by the possibility that the accused would be
245. Id. at 186.
246. Id. at 187-88 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 549.43 (2002)).
247. Id. at 188.
248. See id.
249. Id. at 188-89.
250. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (requiring appeals only from final orders); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1292 (2000) (allowing an exception to the final order requirement for certain
interlocutory orders).
251. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 189 (2003) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
252. Id.





found not guilty at trial and would therefore not have the opportunity to
appeal the order to forcibly medicate made before trial.
256
Justice Scalia recognized that an appeal of an order granting
involuntary medication is sought in order to obtain an injunction preventing
the treatment. 257 He argued that the ability to appeal solely because the
remedy available after final judgment was undesirable was "emphatically
rejected" by prior holdings. 258 To support this contention, he pointed to
Riggins, which held that the proper remedy for an order to involuntarily
medicate was reversal of the conviction.
259
Justice Scalia concluded that the collateral order exception should be
interpreted strictly. 260 He contended that strict application of the collateral
order exception was justified due to the infrequency of cases allowing the
exception. 26' He asserted that neither of the two grounds for exceptions
recognized in criminal cases were relevant to an appeal from an order to
involuntarily medicate.262 He argued that Riggins supported this conclusion
because it indicated that the appealable issue was not moot after trial and
the appealable issue was not related to the appropriateness of the trial.263
Justice Scalia warned that the majority's decision to allow the
immediate appeal of a pre-trial order granting involuntary medication
would have a negative impact on the court system.264 He argued that the
former precedent, requiring non-final orders to be reviewed after the
conclusion of the trial even if the non-final order infringed on a defendant's
constitutional rights, was effectively overruled by the majority's deci-
sion.265 By dispensing with precedent, defendants could now engage in
what he called "opportunistic behavior." 266 For instance, a criminal de-
fendant could interrupt a trial and prolong the proceedings by requesting an
immediate appeal if any order granted during trial infringed on any of the
defendant's constitutional rights.267 Such behavior, Scalia argued, would
256. Id.
257. Id. at 189.
258. Id. at 190.
259. Id. at 189-90.
260. Id. at 190.
261. Id. at 190-91. Justice Scalia stated: "[Iun the 54 years since we invented the exception,
we have found only three types of prejudgment orders in criminal cases appealable." Id. at 190.
262. Id. at 191.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See id. at 191-93 (stating that the majority's decision revamped the collateral order
doctrine by dispensing with the third requirement as long as the non-final decision involves a
severe intrusion on a constitutional right).
266. Id. at 191.
267. Id. Justice Scalia stated that:
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clog up the court system with unnecessary appeals and threaten the
efficiency of the trial process itself.268
IV. IMPACT
While most commentators have applauded the Sell decision for
providing lower courts with a better test to use when deciding whether to
grant an order allowing forcible medication, some have expressed skep-
ticism regarding the efficacy of the test.269 Critics argue that the new test is
not useful because the Court failed to instruct the lower courts how to
balance the criteria outlined in the test.2 70 They theorize his lack of
instruction will absorb court resources by causing more work.271 Only time
will show whether the standard proves to be an effective guide to lower
courts. 272
The decision in Sell raises questions related to the flexibility of the
Pate rule, which does not allow an incompetent individual to be tried on
criminal charges. 273 For instance, would it be possible for an incompetent
individual to waive his Sixth Amendment right to be competent at his trial
A trial-court order requiring the defendant to wear an electronic bracelet could be
attacked as an immediate infringement of the constitutional fight to "bodily integrity";
an order refusing to allow the defendant to wear a T-shirt that says "Black Power" in
front of the jury could be attacked as an immediate violation of First Amendment
rights; and an order compelling testimony could be attacked as an immediate denial
[of] Fifth Amendment fights.
Id. at 191-92.
268. Id. at 191.
269. Compare Charles Lane, Court Sets Guidelines for Forced Medication, WASHINGTON
POST, June 17, 2003, at Al, and Robert B. Bluey, Supreme Court Makes It Harder to Forcibly
Drug Inmates, CYBERCAST NEWS SERVICE, June 17, 2003, at http://www.cnsnews.com/
ViewNation.asp?Page=%5Cnation%5Carchive%5C200306%5CNAT200330617b.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 12, 2004) with Christopher H. Schroeder, Editorial, Drugging Defendants: Supreme
Court Sets Limits, But Is That Enough?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 19, 2003, at 8,
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0618/p08sO3-comv.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
See also McDonald, supra note 85, at 308 (stating that the Sell decision was confusing because it
does not provide a clear framework for courts to use when the basis for medicating is the
individuals dangerousness or grave mental illness).
270. Lane, supra note 269, at Al.
271. Id.; but see Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003) (stating that requests for an
order granting involuntary medication solely on competency grounds would be rare); Schroeder,
supra note 269 (stating that the decision will only affect a "tiny" portion of trials).
272. Lane, supra note 269, at Al; see Schroeder, supra note 269; see also United States v.
Kourey, 276 F. Supp. 2d 580, 580-81 (S.D. W.Va. 2003) (denying an order for forcible
medication under Sell because the state had failed to determine if the detainee was dangerous);
United States v. Evans, 293 F. Supp. 2d. 668, 674 (W.D. Va. 2003) (finding that a misdemeanor
charge was a serious offense but denying order because the amount of time spent in a mental
institution was greater than the amount of time the individual would be imprisoned if found
guilty); State v. Jacobs, 828 A.2d 587, 589 (Conn. 2003) (denying an order to forcibly medicate
because the effect medication would have on the individual's trial rights had not been considered).
273. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 377-79 (1966).
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in order to resolve the charges against him without being medicated.274 The
possibility was discussed in an amici brief filed in Sell. 275 The Eighth
Circuit recently explored this issue in United States v. Morin.
276
The defendant in Morin was charged with murder.277 After his arrest
he was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and treated voluntarily with
medication. 278 He petitioned the court to allow him to waive his com-
petency rights and to stop taking his medication. 279 The court avoided
ruling on the waiver issue because the defendant's competency had never
been challenged, thus there was no opportunity for him to waive the
right. 280 Since the defendant had been voluntarily taking the medication,
Sell did not apply and the defendant could stop taking the medication
whenever he wanted. 281
Morin helps to illustrate the difficulties present when the individual
requesting the waiver does not want to be medicated. Theoretically, in
order to waive the competency requirement, the individual must be
competent because an individual cannot waive a right if he or she does not
understand the right being waived. 282 To become competent the individual
must take antipsychotic medication. 283 This leaves the individual con-
fronting a catch-22; in order to waive the right, the individual must suffer
the vary harm he or she is trying to avoid.284 Thus, it is unlikely that the
Court will allow the competency requirement to be waived.
285
The Sell decision not only impacts the legal community; it also impacts
the medical community because the Court's requirement that forcible
medication be medically appropriate rests on the judgment of medical
professionals. 286 Some medical professionals operate under the theory that
treatment is only necessary when its sole function is to heal. 287 When the
274. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
275. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychiatry
and the Law as Amici Curiae at 29, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664).
276. 338 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2003).
277. Morin, 338 F.3d at 840.
278. Id. at 841.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 842.
281. Id. at 842-43.
282. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychiatry




286. Evelyn Burton, Editorial, When to Drug a Prisoner, WASHINGTON POST, June 17, 2003,
at A20.
287. Richard E. Redding & Kursten Hensl, Do No Harm: Should We Medicate to Execute?,
COMMONWEAL, June 20, 2003, at 9, available at 2003 WL 10223186.
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effect of treatment serves a dual function of effectuating punishment and
treatment, medical professionals are faced with a complicated decision
whereby their professional ethics may be compromised. 288 This decision
becomes more complicated as the potential punishment for the crime the
defendant is charged with becomes more serious.28 9
Dr. Sell has already spent more time awaiting trial in prison and a
mental health facility then he would have spent in prison had he been
convicted on the original fraud charges filed in 1997.290 On remand, the
Government did not attempt to get an order allowing them to forcibly
medicate Dr. Sell.291 Nevertheless, the Government maintained that Dr.
Sell was incompetent to stand trial. 292 Despite the Government's efforts,
Dr. Sell has steadfastly argued that he is competent to stand trial in his
present state without medication.293 Initially, the district court found that
Dr. Sell was incompetent without medication. 294 However, the district
court recently found Dr. Sell competent to stand trial without medication
and allowed his trial to go forward. 295
V. CONCLUSION
In Sell, the Supreme Court responded to the confusion lower courts
were experiencing by providing them with guidelines for determining
whether to grant an order allowing forcible medication of a non-dangerous,
incompetent pre-trial detainee.296 The Court held that the order could be
288. Burton, supra note 286, at A20.
289. Redding, supra note 287, at 9; see Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1036-37 (8th Cir.
2003) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (finding that placing a physician in a position where their decision
regarding medical appropriateness could result in a prisoners death was contrary to the medical
profession's ethical standards).
290. Lane, supra note 269, at Al. Since committed to the Springfield facility, Sell has
claimed that the guards at the facility torture him and the other inmates. Carolyn Tuft, Dentist
Wins Round; Judge Orders; Tapes of Alleged Abuse by Guards, ST. LOUiS POST-DISPATCH, May
20, 2004, at C 1. The abuse was caught on videotape and a judge recently ordered the Government
to release the tape. Id.
291. Carolyn Tuft, Dentist Is Still Unfit for Trial, Psychologist Says, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, May 22, 2004, at 16.
292. Tuft, supra note 291, at 16.
293. Id.
294. Id. To prove his competency, Sell took to the stand and answered questions regarding
details of his life including the schools he attended and his children's birthdays. Id. He was also
able to answer questions about the charges against him and the function of all of the court mem-
bers. Id. Despite this testimony, the judge ruled that Sell was still incompetent to stand trial based
on testimony from a Government psychiatrist. Id. It is still not known whether the Government
will try again to have Sell involuntarily medicated. Id.
295. Peter Shinkle, Judge Rules Dentist Held for Years Is Mentally Fit for Trial, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, July 13, 2004, at BO.
296. Sell v. United States 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
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granted if the government could show that (1) an important governmental
interest was at stake, (2) "involuntary medication [would] significantly
further" the governmental interest, (3) involuntary medication was "neces-
sary to further" the governmental interest, and (4) the medication was
medically appropriate.297 The Court also held that interlocutory orders
could be appealed if they involved an important constitutional right that
could become moot once the trial was completed.
298
Tiffany L. Johnson
297. Id. at 180-81.
298. Id. at 177.
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